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NOTE
A WALL OF LEGISLATIVE OBSTACLES IN
THE PATH OF A WOMAN EXERCISING HER
RIGHT TO AN ABORTION: PLANNED
PARENTHOOD ARIZONA INC. V. BETLACH
BY ANGELA BRESLIN

∗

INTRODUCTION
(The Constitution) is made for people of fundamentally differing
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and
familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict
1
with the Constitution of the United States.

Abortion rights are controversial; on this we can all agree.
Emotions and opinions aside, constitutionally protected rights must be
enforced by courts through invalidating legislative actions that infringe
on those rights. A woman has a constitutional right to an abortion.2 In
2012, the Arizona legislature attempted to limit that right. The
legislature enacted a statute that would have deprived any physician who
performs elective abortions, or any facility where elective abortions are
performed, from receiving Medicaid funding for any of their services,
including family planning and preventive care.3 In Planned Parenthood
Arizona Inc. v. Betlach (“Betlach”), a physician, three individuals, and

∗
J.D. Candidate 2015, Golden Gate University School of Law. I would like to extend my
gratitude to Kassie Cardullo, Professor Helen Chang and Professor Ed Baskauskas for their
invaluable guidance throughout the writing and editorial process.
1
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (quoting Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)).
2
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 153.
3
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.05(B) (Westlaw 2014).
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Planned Parenthood sued to have the statute declared invalid as a
violation of federal law. The district court granted summary judgment to
the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined the State from enforcing the
statute, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.4
However, had this statute gone into effect, individuals living in
Arizona would have suffered numerous consequences and violations of
their rights. Firstly, no Medicaid recipient in Arizona could have
obtained federally subsidized healthcare services from healthcare
providers who also performed elective abortions or from facilities where
such abortions were performed.5 In other words, the legislation would
have deprived women in Arizona of their choice in provider for familyplanning and preventive-care services.6
The statute would have also cut off funding to physicians and
facilities that also perform elective, or “nontherapeutic,”7 abortions.
Arizona citizens already pay for elective abortions privately because
Medicaid does not cover them.8 Under the statute, a Medicaid recipient
would have had to pay out of pocket for all family-planning and
preventive-care services from any physician who also happens to
perform elective abortions.9 Thus, women who rely on Medicaid
reimbursements for family-planning services and preventive care would
have had to find other physicians in order to afford their care.10 This
4

Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 858 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’d, 727
F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014); see also Planned Parenthood Ariz.,
Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Ariz. 2012), appeal dismissed, 727 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013).
5
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.05(B) (Westlaw 2014).
6
Medicaid’s choice-of-provider provision prohibits the limiting of a woman’s choice of
physician for subsidized family-planning and preventive-care services, with few narrow exceptions.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(23) (Westlaw 2014).
7
A nontherapeutic abortion is one that is not medically necessary for the health of the
mother. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).
8
The Constitution does not require states to use federal funding from Title XIX of the
Social Security Act (Medicaid) for abortions. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 297-98 (1980)
(holding that funding restrictions on medically necessary abortions in the Hyde Amendment, as
applied to Medicaid participants, do not violate “liberty” protected by the Due Process clause of the
5th Amendment as recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)); see, e.g., Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 465-66 (1977) (holding that States are not required to use Medicaid funding for
nontherapeutic abortions); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 175, 198-99 (1991) (holding that
government-funded programs, such as Title X, can set limitations on the scope of funding, such as
prohibiting employees of Title X funds from counseling, referring, and advocating for abortion, so
long as the conduct regulated is within the scope of the funding, but the government cannot regulate
conduct outside the scope of the federal funding).
9
Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
10
See Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief ¶ 39, Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc.
v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 858 (D. Ariz. 2013) (No. 12CV01533), aff’d, 727 F.3d 960 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1283 (2014), 2012 WL 2892201. All three plaintiffs were recipients
of Medicaid and had long-time physicians who would no longer be able to provide their family-
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cutoff would have further reduced the number of physicians within
Arizona who perform abortions, especially in medically underserved and
low-provider areas within the state.11 When women do not have actual
access to doctors who perform elective abortions, they cannot exercise
their constitutionally protected right to pre-viability abortions.12
Roe v. Wade is one of the best-known cases because it first
memorialized women’s constitutional right to abortion.13 However, the
past four and a half decades are riddled with legislative attempts to erode
the quality of a woman’s choice in exercising that constitutional right.14
Legal abortions have been denied public funding.15 Legislation has
attempted to deny elective abortions to women who did not first obtain
written consent from their husbands.16 Twenty-four-hour waiting periods
have been imposed, forcing women to travel long distances and take
multiple days off from work or school.17 In some federally funded
programs, physicians are prohibited from counseling, referring, or
advocating abortion as an option in family planning.18 Additionally,
certain types of medically supported abortion procedures have been

planning and preventive-care services and receive their Medicaid reimbursements. Id. (“If the Act
goes into effect, they will be prevented from receiving services from their provider of choice, will
have their health care interrupted, and may encounter difficulties finding alternative care.”).
11
As of 2008, there were already fewer than twenty physicians in the entire state of Arizona
who performed abortions. GUTTMACHER INST., TRENDS IN ABORTION IN ARIZONA, 1973–2008
(Jan. 2011), available at www.guttmacher.org/presentations/state_ab_pt/arizona.pdf; see also
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10, ¶ 39 (alleging that plaintiffs lived in
“low provider” and “medically underserved” areas).
12
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (defining the compelling point for which a state
may interfere with a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion is after viability, when a fetus
could survive outside the woman’s womb).
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914
(2000); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976).
15
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 470; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 310 (validating
withholding of Medicaid funding even for medically necessary abortions).
16
This legislation was invalidated as an unconstitutional infringement of a woman’s right to
an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69; accord Casey, 505
U.S. at 898.
17
Casey, 505 U.S. at 838-39 (1992) (holding the twenty-four-hour waiting period as
constitutional).
18
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. at 192 (holding as constitutionally firm to deny participating
Title X physicians and their staff from soliciting, referring, or counseling abortion as an option to
their patients).
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outright prohibited.19 These back-door attempts to overrule the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade must be called out for what
they are: wolves in sheeps’ clothing.20 Many of these legislative
attempts to erode the force of Roe v. Wade have been found to be
constitutional in isolation, but when these legislative acts are looked at as
a whole, they equate to nothing more than a scheme to substantially
impede a woman’s access to abortion.21
The facts of Betlach exemplify legislative backdoor infringement of
a woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to an abortion.22 Using
Medicaid requirements as a cloak, the Arizona legislature attempted to
deny access to legal abortions by reducing, if not effectively eliminating,
the physicians and the facilities that could provide abortions within the
state.
The narrow issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit in reviewing
Betlach was whether the legislation at issue contravened the federal
Medicaid Act.23 The court swiftly invalidated the legislation, basing its
holding on traditional statutory interpretation.24 The Ninth Circuit’s
holding, however, will have a limited impact on the bigger issue:
infringement of a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion. In
Betlach, there was a federal statute that directly conflicted with
Arizona’s enacted statue.25 However, the door is still left open for
similar anti-abortion legislation to go into effect when there is no
conflicting federal statute on point. Until the bigger issue is resolved,
this type of legislation will continue to impede a woman’s access to an
abortion. Accordingly, until the issue is addressed head-on, the future
19

See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930 (finding statute prohibiting partial-birth
abortions invalid because it did not have an exception for the woman’s health and it would have
prevented many alternative forms of abortion); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 133 (2007) (finding
prohibition of “intact D & E” abortion procedure as valid legislation).
20
See Erik Eckholm, Access to Abortion Falling as States Pass Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/01/04/us/women-losing-access-to-abortion-as-opponentsgain-ground-in-state-legislatures.html.
21
See e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, No. 1351008, 2014 WL 5040899, at *29 (5th Cir. Oct. 9, 2014) (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (“[w]e cannot look at women’s ability to overcome an obstacle in isolation and
use that predicted ability to overcome barriers to somehow conclude that the obstacle is not
substantial or undue.”); Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013
State
Policy
Review,
GUTTMACHER
INSTITUTE,
www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2014)
(“Over the course of the year, 39 states enacted 141 provisions related to reproductive health and
rights. Half of these new provisions, 70 in 22 states, sought to restrict access to abortion services.”).
22
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
23
Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013).
24
Id.
25
Id.
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appears increasingly bleak for future claims against legislative
infringement of this constitutionally protected right.
This Note addresses the limited impact of the Ninth Circuit’s
holding, especially for women living in states hostile to abortion rights.26
These legislative attempts to infringe on a woman’s right to an abortion
are based on opinion and emotion, not reason and common sense. An
objective view of the legislation stacked against a woman in exercising
her right, including legislation against physicians who provide the
service, illustrates how all of these obstacles have effectively become a
wall. A woman’s constitutional right should not continue to be chipped
away, one state statute at a time, until there is no real choice to a
woman’s right to an abortion. Moreover, this type of legislation falls
hardest on women and families who cannot afford access to alternative
care.27 If and when there are no physicians or clinics available to
perform legal abortions, then the state has effectively made the woman’s
choice for her. It is indisputable that a right is not a right at all if it
cannot be exercised.
This Note argues for a revival of the Casey Test.28 The test should
be applied to statutes as a whole, asking whether the purpose or effect of
a statute places a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman in
exercising her legal right to choose to terminate her pregnancy before
viability.29 Part I of this Note looks into the legal and procedural
background of Betlach, including all of the plaintiffs’ original claims and
the decision’s limited impact. Part II analyzes how the legislation in
Betlach would have failed under the Casey test. Specifically, Part II
addresses how this type of legislation, both in purpose and effect, places
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman accessing an abortion.
Finally, this Note concludes with a recommendation for future plaintiffs
26

For more information on states hostile to abortion rights, see Rachel Benson Gold &
Elizabeth Nash, Troubling Trend: More States Hostile to Abortion Rights as Middle Ground Shrinks,
15
GUTTMACHER
POL’Y
REV.
1
(2012),
available
at
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/15/1/gpr150114.html; see also Nash et al., supra note 21.
27
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10, ¶¶ 33-37 (alleging that
Planned Parenthood Arizona had thirteen medical centers in areas the federal government classified
as “medically underserved”). The federal government made the classification based on four
variables, one of which is the percentage of the population with incomes below the poverty level.
Additionally, five of their centers in Arizona are in “low provider” areas, based on similar criteria,
including high percentage of the population under the poverty level. See, e.g., Find Shortage Areas:
HPSA & MUA/P by Address, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES,
http://datawarehouse.hrsa.gov/geoadvisor/shortagedesignationadvisor.aspx (last visited Aug. 28,
2014); Guidelines for MUA and MUP Designation, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES, www.hrsa.gov/shortage/mua/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).
28
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
29
Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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to raise the infringement issue, allowing courts to address the impact this
type of anti-abortion legislation as a whole has on a constitutionally
protected right.
I.

THE LEGAL CONTEXT AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD ARIZONA INC. V. BETLACH

The legal framework and procedural background of Betlach provide
context for the Ninth Circuit’s limited holding. The legal framework
explains the possible motivations behind Planned Parenthood’s strategic
decisions, which are readily displayed in the case’s procedural history.
Ultimately, the plaintiffs chose to narrow the issue before the court to the
dispositive claim only. As a result, the court was not given the
opportunity to address the other constitutional issues. Though the
plaintiffs were justified in their strategic decision, and the Ninth Circuit
accurately decided the case, the holding has a limited impact on future
plaintiffs.
A.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ABORTION

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey provide the legal framework to discuss a woman’s
right to an abortion.30 Roe v. Wade established a woman’s ability to
choose abortion, before viability, as a right protected by the
Constitution.31 This right is derived from both the Ninth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it is a
protected “liberty” interest.32
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackman said that, in regard to a
woman’s decisional autonomy over her body in consultation with her
physician, “If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated
by an abortion free of interference by the State.”33 In other words, the
state may not interfere with a woman in accessing and obtaining an
abortion from a licensed physician. The point at which the state may
interfere is viability, when the fetus can survive outside the mother’s
body.34 The Court approximated the viability point at the end of the first
trimester.35 Prior to this point, the “abortion decision and its effectuation
30

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 163.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
31
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must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending
physician.”36 The Court recognized the state’s interest in protecting the
mother by allowing for state regulation that promoted the health of the
mother subsequent to the end of the first trimester.37 When the fetus is
considered viable, the state is permitted to regulate or prohibit abortions
in order to protect the health of both the mother and the viable fetus.38
However, the state is not permitted to ban an abortion when it is
“necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”39
Roe v. Wade laid the baseline for protection of a woman’s choice to
terminate her pregnancy before viability, while Casey set the boundaries
on legislative interference and allowed for some state inference even
before viability.40 The Court in Casey held that legislation is invalid
when it places an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abortion if it
creates a substantial obstacle, in purpose or effect, in a woman’s path to
accessing an abortion pre-viability.41 The Casey Court’s application of
what constitutes an undue burden set the guidelines for how the lower
courts weigh substantial interference, which violates the constitutional
protection, versus incidental interference, which does not violate the
Constitution.42
Unfortunately, the review of a woman’s constitutionally protected
right has morphed into a piecemeal approach. This approach asks
whether state legislation infringes on a woman’s right to an abortion by
analyzing the statute section by section, with little to no regard for the
total effect that the statute, as a whole, has on that right.43
36

Id. at 164.
Id. at 163.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 163–64.
40
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992). The Court also did
away with the trimester framework of Roe v. Wade and replaced it with a line between pre-viability
and post-viability that defines when a State may regulate abortions and what standard of scrutiny
applies. Id at 870.
41
Id at 877.
42
Id. (finding the requirement of spousal written consent a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman in obtaining an abortion, pre-viability, but finding information distributed to the mother
promoting alternatives to abortion, twenty-four-hour waiting periods, and certain reporting
requirements not unduly burdensome).
43
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, No. 1351008, 2014 WL 5040899, at *24 (5th Cir. Oct. 9, 2014) (Dennis, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (criticizing the panel for the “threadbare consideration of the purpose and effect
of the law, each in isolation, and without reference to important contextual realities in which the law
will operate”); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406
(5th Cir. 2013); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding no
undue burden because plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate that a large fraction of women would
be affected by one clinic’s closure); Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden , 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).
37
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF PLANNED PARENTHOOD ARIZONA
INC. V. BETLACH

The procedural background of Betlach explains, in part, how this
particular anti-abortion legislation was not subjected to the Casey test.
Arizona’s statute states, “[Arizona] or any political subdivision of
[Arizona] may not enter into a contract with or make a grant to any
person that performs nonfederally qualified abortions or maintains or
operates a facility where nonfederally qualified abortions are performed
for the provision of family planning services.”44 Planned Parenthood is a
nonprofit organization that has thirteen clinics within Arizona and
provides a range of family-planning services and preventive care.45
Planned Parenthood clinics in Arizona treat about 3,000 Medicaid
recipients each year and receive approximately $350,000 for their
services, not including their privately funded nontherapeutic abortion
services.46
The summer before the legislation would have gone into effect,
Planned Parenthood received a letter from its contractor for Medicaid
reimbursements requesting that Planned Parenthood return a signed form
stating that it would not perform elective abortions or continue to operate
any facility where elective abortions were performed.47 The letter stated
that if Planned Parenthood did not return the form completed, it would
no longer receive any Medicaid reimbursements for its federally
qualified services, family planning, and preventive care.48
The
reimbursements Planned Parenthood had been receiving without issue for

But see Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 194 (D. Utah 1973) (refusing to piece out the statute and
evaluate constitutionality for each particular part but invalidating the statute as a whole: “Each and
every challenged part of these statutes was intended to and does contribute, when each statute is read
as a whole, to that improper purpose and effect . . . . [T]he Court is neither obliged nor free to
scrutinize the minutiae of these statutes to cull out those parts that, given a strained interpretation,
might be thought to have an independent constitutionality. The Court cannot and will not edit these
statutes in order to alter the legislative purpose . . . . We find all of the statutes and portions of
statutes contested herein invalid in toto.”).
44
Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2013);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.05(F)(4) (Westlaw 2014) (defining a “[n]onfederally
qualified abortion” as “an abortion that does not meet the requirements for federal reimbursement
under title XIX of the [S]ocial [S]ecurity [A]ct.”), invalidated by Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v.
Betlach, 727 F.3d 960.
45
Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d at 964.
46
Id.
47
The Medicaid contractor was Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System (AHCCCS).
Id. at 965.
48
Id.
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nearly twenty years would essentially cease, unless Planned Parenthood
stopped providing elective abortion services.49
In July 2012, Planned Parenthood, along with three individuals and
a physician, filed a complaint to prevent the statute from going into
effect and eliminating their Medicaid reimbursements.50 The complaint
alleged that the legislation directly violated the freedom-of-choice
provision in the Medicaid Act, as well as the Due Process Clause,
Supremacy Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Contracts Clause of the
U.S. Constitution.51 The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona
granted a preliminary injunction, finding that the Medicaid freedom-ofchoice provision52 conferred individual rights enforceable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.53 Additionally, the district court found that the plaintiffs
would likely succeed on the merits of their Medicaid Act violation claim,
and that Planned Parenthood would suffer irreparable harm if the
preliminary injunction were not granted.54
With the preliminary injunction granted, the plaintiffs filed for
summary judgment as to the alleged Medicaid violation, based on the
conclusions of law determined by the district court.55 Specifically, the
district court found that the state legislation violated the federal Medicaid
Act by the explicit language in the Act’s choice-of-provider provision.56
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit had addressed a virtually identical issue
that further supported the district court’s determination. The Seventh
Circuit case, Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Indiana, affirmed a
preliminary injunction barring enforcement of Indiana legislation that
denied Medicaid funding to physicians who performed elective abortions
or facilities where elective abortions were performed.57 Indiana’s
legislation ignored Medicaid’s requirement that recipients may use funds
to pay for family-planning services from any qualified physician within
49

Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d 868, 886 (D. Ariz. 2012),
appeal dismissed, 727 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013).
50
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10.
51
Id. ¶ 4. This Note focuses only on limited impact of the Ninth Circuit’s holding on the
issue of a woman’s constitutional right to an abortion protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. Other constitutional claims, though arguably appropriate as well, will not be discussed.
Of the constitutional issues raised in the complaint, none regarded a woman’s constitutional right to
an abortion, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
52
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(23), 1396d(a)(4)(C) (Westlaw 2014).
53
Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 876-80 (applying the
Blessing three-factor test and determining that the federal statute creates an enforceable right).
54
Id.
55
Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 858, 860 (D. Ariz. 2013).
56
See Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d at 883–84.
57
Planned Parenthood of Ind., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of Health, 699 F.3d 962,
988 (7th Cir. 2012).
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the state.58 Like Arizona’s scheme, the Indiana legislation was intended
to stop any indirect subsidization of abortions.59 The Seventh Circuit
found that Indiana’s legislation directly violated Medicaid’s free-choiceof-provider provision by limiting Medicaid recipients’ choice among
qualified providers.60
On summary judgment in Betlach, the narrow question before the
district court was whether Arizona’s legislation violated the Medicaid
Act as a matter of law, an inquiry that depended only on whether the
state law was incompatible with the federal law.61 The district court
ultimately held that Arizona’s legislation was invalid because the state
statute directly contradicted Medicaid Act’s free-choice-of-provider
provision, as a matter of law.62 Therefore, Planned Parenthood was
granted summary judgment based solely on statutory grounds.63
Thereafter, Arizona appealed the district court’s summary judgment
that permanently enjoined the enforcement of the legislation against such
Medicaid providers as Planned Parenthood.64 The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Medicaid
Act’s free-choice-of-provider provision confers a private right of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the state legislation violated the
Medicaid Act as a matter of law.65 More specifically, the court of
appeals found that the Arizona legislation violated the Medicaid Act by
denying recipients a choice in a qualified provider for their familyplanning services, a freedom explicitly granted by the Medicaid freechoice-of-provider provision.66
Though the plaintiffs in this case were able to prevail on this narrow
claim, the success had a limited impact in furthering a woman’s
fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy before viability. Since
Planned Parenthood’s summary judgment was granted purely on the state
statute’s violation of the federal Medicaid Act, no constitutional
arguments in the complaint were addressed by the district court or the
court of appeals.67
58

Id.
Id. at 967.
60
Id. at 978–80.
61
Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 922 F. Supp. 2d 858, 860 (D. Ariz. 2013).
62
Id. at 864.
63
Id. at 866.
64
Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960, 963 (9th Cir. 2013).
65
Id. The court also found that there was no need to address the appeal of the preliminary
injunction since the district court entered a final judgment while the preliminary injunction was on
appeal and the permanent injunction mooted the preliminary-injunction appeal. Id.
66
Planned Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d at 963.
67
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10.
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This holding ensured that the Arizona legislation would not go into
effect, protecting Arizona residents, but it remains uncertain what will
happen to other legislative attempts to erode Roe v. Wade when
confronting federal statutes that lack an explicit free-choice-of-provider
provision. In other words, when federal statutes do not create and spell
out a woman’s right to freedom of choice in her provider for familyplanning services or preventive care, a woman’s constitutional right to an
abortion is still at risk.
II.

THE LEGISLATION IN BETLACH WOULD HAVE FAILED
UNDER THE CASEY TEST

Had there not been a federal statute on point that disposed of the
issue in Betlach, the plaintiffs could have raised the issue against
unconstitutional infringement of a woman’s right to an abortion previability.68 Raising the issue gives courts an opportunity to address the
burden this kind of legislation places in the path of woman in exercising
her right to an abortion. The following sections highlight how a court
would find Arizona’s legislation invalid under Casey’s undue-burden
test.69 Specifically, Arizona’s legislation places a substantial obstacle to
a woman accessing abortion services in both purpose and effect.
A.

ARIZONA’S LEGISLATION PLACES AN UNDUE BURDEN IN PURPOSE
ON A WOMAN EXERCISING HER RIGHT TO AN ABORTION

Arizona legislators created the legislation to erect another barrier for
women attempting to exercise their right to obtain abortion services. In
their amicus curiae brief, twenty-nine of Arizona’s senators,
representatives, and representatives-elect supported the legislation and
unambiguously stated that they did not want any federal funding to
“indirectly” support abortion services in the State of Arizona.70 The
amicus curiae brief stated, “Through this restriction, the State
acknowledged that an abortion business benefits from taxpayer funding
when the business’ proprietor receives such funds to pay for healthcare
services (in this case, family planning services).”71 In this manner, the
legislators expressed a clear intent not to allow the “abortion business” to
68

Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10.
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
70
Amicus Curiae Brief of 29 Arizona Senators, Representatives, and Representatives-Elect
in Support of Defendants-Appellants and Reversal of the District of Arizona at 1, Planned
Parenthood Ariz. Inc. v. Betlach, 727 F.3d 960 (No. 12-17558), 2012 WL 6850110.
71
Id. at 2.
69

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2014

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 8
BRESLIN (DO NOT DELETE)

64

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/26/14 10:19 AM

[Vol. 45

benefit from Medicaid funding, even when it is legally obtained through
traditionally Medicaid-funded services, such as preventive care and
family planning. By targeting abortion services and attacking the
“abortion business” as a whole, Arizona legislators were attempting to
completely cut off federal funding to all abortion providers within the
state who have been receiving reimbursements for their qualified
Medicaid services for over twenty years, with no better justification other
than not wanting to “indirectly” support abortion services.
When state legislators target all facilities that offer elective abortion
services and label them as part of a “business” that should not be
indirectly funded federally, they are attacking the necessary components
for a woman to effectuate a legal, pre-viability abortion. The purpose
behind the statute is to prevent women from being able to obtain an
abortion by adding another obstacle: unavailability of facilities and
physicians who can perform such services. In sum, the state legislators
purposefully targeted a specific type of service as part of a business that
should not be allowed to participate like other businesses when
performing Medicaid qualified services because they do not agree with
the service provided.
When legislators make it harder for physicians to sustain a business
in Arizona they are intentionally placing an obstacle in the path of a
woman to obtain an abortion. The only option left for facilities that
depend on federal funding as part of their business operations, like
Planned Parenthood, is to stop performing elective abortions.72 This is
no choice at all. What the legislators deem as the state’s “public policy”
is nothing short of a take-it-or-leave-it situation that forces physicians
and abortion facilities’ hands to “refrain” from performing elective
abortion services within the state, because those legislators do not agree
with the service.73
The Arizona legislators’ stated purpose was to further reduce the
number of abortions performed in the State of Arizona. In support of this
argument, Arizona legislators referenced a study showing the
relationship between public funding and the incidence of abortion within
the state.74 In 2009, the Guttmacher Institute had conducted a Literature
Review that demonstrated a strong consensus that abortion rates are
reduced when public funding is restricted.75 The legislators used this
study to try to demonstrate that by taking away any federal funding to
72

Id. at 5.
Id.
74
Id. at 9–10.
75
Id. at 13.
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corporations or facilities such as Planned Parenthood of Arizona,
abortion services would not be “indirectly subsidized” with federal
funds.76 The Guttmacher studies, however, demonstrate less of a link
between federal funding “subsidizing” abortions in such facilities and
more of link between declining federal funding and declining numbers of
women exercising their right to abortion.77 What Arizona legislators
refused to acknowledge was that these abortions performed in the state
were legal and that women had a constitutionally protected right in
accessing them. This was a purposeful attempt by Arizona state
legislature to overturn Roe, which is an invalid purpose.78
Targeting and denying funding for Medicaid qualified services to
physicians and facilities simply because they also happen to perform
privately funded abortions is a direct attempt to cut all abortion services
entirely out of the equation, the purpose of which is to further antiabortion policy. Legislation of this type does nothing but place obstacles
in the paths of women trying to exercise their constitutional right to
abortion. Without federal funding, many physicians cannot provide
necessary medical services to their patients, and more women are
deterred from accessing such services. This legislation was meant to
punish rather than support women’s rights.
B.

ARIZONA’S LEGISLATION PLACES AN UNDUE BURDEN IN EFFECT
ON A WOMAN EXERCISING HER RIGHT TO AN ABORTION

The effect of Arizona’s legislation would have been to place a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman trying to access abortion
services in Arizona by both removing physicians already in low-provider
areas and further decreasing providers within the state as a whole. The
net effect of this legislation is outlined by the facts presented in the
complaint, the findings of fact at the preliminary-injunction phase, and
the statistical analysis of Arizona’s abortion rates.79 Thus, the legislation
would fail the second prong of the Casey test because eliminating federal
funding would have the effect of pushing both the physicians who
perform abortions and the facilities where they are performed out of
areas already in need of physicians specialized in family planning and
76

Id. at 9–16.
STANLEY K. HENSHAW ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., RESTRICTIONS ON MEDICAID
FUNDING
FOR
ABORTIONS:
A
LITERATURE
REVIEW
(2009),
available
at
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/MedicaidLitReview.pdf.
78
See Jane L. v. Bangerter, 102 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1996) (invalidating state legislation for
having the purpose of overriding Roe).
79
Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Betlach, 899 F. Supp. 2d 868 (D. Ariz. 2012).
77
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preventive care, as well as abortions.80 We know this because five of the
Planned Parenthood centers are in areas classified as “low provider,”81
and thirteen are in areas classified as “medically underserved.”82
Although the complaint focused on the direct effect on women and
families who would not be able to access family-planning and
preventive-care services from their personal physicians, another effect of
such legislation would be that without Medicaid reimbursement, many
clinics such as Planned Parenthood would not have been able to remain
in operation. This is especially true in areas where the majority of the
patients rely on Medicaid funding for their care. Arizona already has
low-provider and medically underserved areas where Planned
Parenthood is one of the few medical resources.83 Thus, a woman in
such an area would have little to no options for accessing familyplanning services, preventive care, or terminating her pregnancy, if she
so chooses.84
The Casey court found it constitutionally valid for state legislation
to incidentally burden a woman’s access to an abortion, as long as the
purpose was valid.85 The Arizona legislators may argue that the
incidental burden of their legislation, reducing physicians and facilities in
the state, does not amount to a substantial burden because the burden is
only incidental. This argument weakens, however, when the legislation
is looked at as a whole. Removing a significant number of physicians
from the state or entirely out of low-provider areas when a woman
cannot afford to take multiple days off of work for a drive across the
state to find a physician, combined with the twenty-four-hour waiting
period, amounts to a state’s legislative “veto” of the woman’s right to
access abortion services.86 Legislation such as this cannot be looked at in
isolation. When this type of state action is stacked on top of the other
anti-abortion legislation already in place in Arizona, the state legislators
80

Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10, ¶ 33. The “medically
underserved” classification is based on four variables: 1) the ratio of primary medical care
physicians per 1,000 populations, 2) the infant mortality rate, 3) the percentage of the population
with incomes below the poverty level, and 4) the percentage of the population age 65 or over. See id.
81
Id. ¶ 33.
82
Id.; see also Guidelines for MUA and MUP Designation, supra note 26’. To find an
overview of statistical information, see Find Shortage Areas: HPSA by State & County, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://hpsafind.hrsa.gov/HPSASearch.aspx (last visited Oc. 5,
2014) (select “Arizona,” “All Counties,” and “Primary Medical Care”)’.
83
Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, supra note 10, ¶ 33.
84
See id. ¶ 33.
85
Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
86
See id. at 897 (finding that requiring a husband’s consent before abortion service can be
provided was an unconstitutional veto power over a woman exercising her right to an abortion previability).
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can no longer claim that this legislation does not amount to a substantial
burden in the path of a woman who seeks to have an abortion.
The type of legislation at issue in Betlach is analogous to the
legislation in Casey, in which the Court refused to uphold legislation that
required a husband’s written consent in order for a woman to obtain an
abortion.87 The Court properly found such requirements are unduly
burdensome on a woman’s right to an abortion because they give the
spouse “veto power” over her right to choose an abortion pre-viability.88
Like spousal veto powers, when state legislators push all abortion
providers out of the State of Arizona, they effectively “veto” a woman’s
choice in the matter. Clinics such as Planned Parenthood would not be
able to remain in medically underserved areas within the state, where
their patients cannot pay out-of-pocket for their family-planning and
preventive-care services, nor compete with clinics that do receive federal
subsidies for the same family-planning services and preventive care.89
Such legislation places a complete wall between a woman’s choice and
her ability to effectuate her choice when there are no longer physicians or
facilities within the state that perform elective abortions. Such
legislation would have given Arizona state legislators veto power over a
woman’s constitutionally protected choice, a veto power the Casey court
refused to allow.
CONCLUSION
The legislation at issue in Betlach would fail under Casey’s undueburden test, in both purpose and effect, when looked at realistically and
in combination with existing legislation.
The current piecemeal
approach used by courts to address potential obstacles in the path of a
woman accessing an abortion needs to come to an end. Instead, such
legislation should be reviewed as a whole and found invalid in its
entirety.
State legislators should not be allowed to override
constitutional rights because they do not agree with them.90 Plaintiffs
must assert their constitutional rights, even when controversial. Judicial
review must be given the opportunity to account for the denial of a

87

Id. at 874.
Id. at 897; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(invalidating a husband-consent requirement as an unconstitutional infringement of a woman’s right
to an abortion pre-Casey).
89
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing that
denying federal funding for elective abortion services makes choosing to have an abortion
impossible for indigent women).
90
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
88
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woman’s constitutionally protected choice because of legislators stacking
legislation against her and her physician. Courts should be given the
opportunity to apply the Casey test to anti-abortion legislation. The facts
of Betlach exemplify the argument plaintiffs should make when there is
not a federal statute expressly in conflict with a state’s anti-abortion
legislation, as there happened to be in Betlach. The wall blocking
women from exercising their right to a legal abortion remains tall and
wide, blocking the poorest first. To call this legislation anything other
than an attack on that constitutional right is to misconstrue the issue
entirely.
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